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The Impact of the War on Drugs on Proce-
dural Fairness and Racial Equality
David Rudovskyt
Twelve years ago, President Reagan declared yet another
War on Drugs.1 Today, after the expenditure of billions of dollars
on a policy built primarily on the coercion and punishment of
drug distributors and users, the War on Drugs has failed to re-
duce significantly, much less eliminate, drugs as a problem in
our society.2 There have been scattered successes, but even with
enormous expenditures of resources, the major evils associated
with drug use and drug trafficking have not been ameliorated,
and we continue to experience widespread abuse of drugs, high
levels of violence, and disintegration of urban life.' To make mat-
ters worse, as I will argue in this Article, the War on Drugs has
had a debilitating impact on our system of constitutional rights
t Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; Partner, Kairys,
Rudovsky, Kalman & Epstein; L.L.B. 1967, New York University School of Law. I have
benefitted from Susan Herman's and Leonard Sosnov's comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.
' See Leslie Maitland, President Gives Plan to Combat Drug Networks, NY Times Al
(Oct 15, 1982). For an account of previous "wars," see Edward J. Epstein, Agency of Fear
ch 11 at 22 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977).
2 The War on Drugs has consumed billions of dollars in law enforcement, interdic-
tion, prosecution, and incarceration expenses. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs,
Crime and the Justice System 126-33 (1992); Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of
Decriminalization, 18 Hofstra L Rev 501, 503-04 (1990); john a. powell and Eileen B.
Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black
Community, 24 UC Davis L Rev 557, 567 (1991); Peter Reuter, Setting Priorities: Budget
and Program Choices for Drug Control, 1994 U Chi Legal F 145. In 1988, Congress stated:
"It is the declared policy of the United States Government to create a Drug Free America
by 1995." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 5251(b), Pub L No 100-690, 102 Stat 4181, 4309
(1988). By all accounts, however, the use and abuse of drugs continues unabated. For ex-
ample, according to the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee's annual
report for 1991, cocaine and heroin are still "readily available" in American cities. Use of
Heroin and Cocaine Increased, Says Intelligence Report, 8 Drug Enforcement Rep 4 (Aug
10, 1992).
' See Steven B. Duke and Albert C. Ross, America's Longest War: Rethinking Our
Tragic Crusade Against Drugs (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1993); powell and Hershenov, 24 UC
Davis L Rev at 559 (cited in note 2); A Symposium on Drug Decriminalization, 18 Hofstra
L Rev 457 (1990); Joseph D. Grano, Crime, Drugs, and the Fourth Amendment: A Reply to
Professor Rudovsky, 1994 U Chi Legal F 297; James B. Zagel, Drug Rhetoric, Courts, and
the Law: A Response to Professor Rudovsky, 1994 U Chi Legal F 275. See generally 1994
U Chi Legal F, entitled "Toward a Rational Drug Policy."
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and on equality for racial minorities. As a result of the aggressive
law enforcement component of the War on Drugs and the acqui-
escence of the courts, constitutional principles have been under-
mined.
There is widespread debate over virtually every aspect of the
War on Drugs, with an increasing number of persons (from quite
different political camps) questioning the very premises of prohib-
iting drugs in our society.4 I too believe that current policies
have aggravated rather than alleviated the problem, but in this
Article I limit my comments to the impact of the War on Drugs
on specific constitutional rights and to its differential impact on
people of color.
It might be expected that the strategies in a war on crime
would discount the interest in protecting civil liberties. On the
front lines, adherence to constitutional restrictions is often un-
derstood as unnecessary and dangerous, placing questionable
limits on police power and discretion. Because self-restraint is
hardly a realistic way to ensure compliance with constitutional
commands, the degree to which the appropriate balance is struck
depends in large part on the independence and integrity of the
courts.
From the beginning, the War on Drugs has in too many in-
stances led to judicial abdication to Executive authority.5 In no
small part this is due to the overused, but symbolically impor-
tant, "war" metaphor. Historically, wars (both hot and cold) have
placed great stress on constitutional rights, and these pressures
have led the courts to countenance substantial limitations on lib-
erty. The internment of Japanese-Americans during World War
II,' the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil
War,7 the imprisonment of strikers and dissidents during World
War I,' and the McCarthy tactics of the Cold War' were all jus-
' See A Symposium on Drug Decriminalization, 18 Hofstra L Rev 457 (1990) (cited in
note 3); Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case For Legalization, 92 Public Int 3 (Summer 1988);
William F. Buckley, Jr., The Futile War on Drugs May be Destroying Rather Than Saving
Our Society, Houston Chronicle A13 (Mar 16, 1993); Milton Friedman, An Open Letter to
Bill Bennett, Wall St Journal 1-14 (Sept 7, 1989).
' See text at 240-63. See also Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil
Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S Cal L Rev 1389 (1993); Steven Wisotsky, Crack.
down: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 Hastings L J 889 (1987).
6 See Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214, 217-20 (1944); Peter Irons, Justice at
War: The Story of the Japanese Internment Cases (Oxford University Press, 1983).
' See Ex parte Milligan, 71 US 2, 115 (1866); Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties and
Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 Mich L Rev 1353 (1993).
' See, for example, Debs v United States, 249 US 211, 212-13 (1919); Schenck v Unit-
ed States, 249 US 47, 52.(1919).
' See, for example, Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951); Norman Dorsen, Paul
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tified in the name of war. During each of these periods, the Su-
preme Court gave virtually complete deference to inflated Execu-
tive claims of imminent danger to the country. In retrospect, we
are highly critical of the excesses of the past, but we fail to use
the same angle of vision to confront the current assault on indi-
vidual rights. Yet the new constitutional mosaic is in many re-
spects even more disturbing than those drawn during earlier pe-
riods."0
Drug prohibition policies implicate a broad range of constitu-
tional rights. Laws prohibiting longstanding religious practices
that involve symbolic uses of drugs challenge the free exercise of
religious rights;" new patterns of law enforcement that target
large groups of persons, often without individualized cause or
suspicion, affect individual rights to privacy;1 2 forfeiture laws
and regulations that impede access to counsel undermine Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial;"3 laws that permit preventive
detention and draconian punishment for drug possession deni-
grate Eighth Amendment rights to bail and sentences that are
not cruel and unusual; 4 and racially-disparate legislative poli-
cies, prosecutorial practices, new investigative techniques, and
forfeiture laws erode Fourteenth Amendment rights to equality
and due process.
In the following sections, I discuss those issues of procedural
fairness that are most affected by our current drug prohibition
policies. I focus first on the Fourth Amendment, as individual
privacy is the area most fundamentally affected by expanded law
enforcement authority. I then consider the impact of the War on
Drugs on the constitutional rights to counsel and racial equality.
Bender, and Burt Neuborne, Political and Civil Rights in the United States ch II (Little
Brown & Co., 1976); Melvin I. Urofsky, A March of Liberty (Alfred A. Knopf, 1988).
'0 See generally Finkelman, 66 S Cal L Rev at 1389 (cited in note 5); Wisotsky, 38
Hastings L J at 889 (cited in note 5).
" See, for example, Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990) (upholding the
denial of unemployment benefits to a Native American whose beliefs required him to use
peyote in religious ceremonies).
12 See, for example, National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656
(1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing as a mandatory condition of placement in
certain positions of the United States Customs Service); United States v Sokolow, 490 US
1 (1989) (finding a reasonable basis to stop the defendant on factors that were included in
drug courier profile).
13 See, for example, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617 (1989)
(stating that the federal forfeiture statute may be invoked even if a defendant is left with-
out funds to retain counsel).
"4 See, for example, United States v Salerno, 481 US 739 (1987); Harmelin v Michi-
gan, 501 US 957 (1991).
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: "THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE
SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS ... [SHALL NOT EXTEND TO DRUG
CASES]."
The conspicuous trend in the Supreme Court to limit consti-
tutional rights has been most emphatic in the area of arrest,
search, and seizure. The heavy reliance we place on the criminal
sanction side of drug policy places a premium on police seizures
of controlled substances and the apprehension and arrest of those
involved in their distribution and possession. Accordingly, just as
the First Amendment became the battleground for laws re-
stricting free speech during the First World War and the Cold
War with the Soviet Union, the Fourth Amendment has become
the focal point for resolving issues of governmental power in im-
plementing the War on Drugs.
The Court's decisions on Fourth Amendment issues have
been sharply one-sided. 5 The Court has deferred to virtually ev-
ery police and prosecutorial demand to limit Fourth Amendment
rights and to eliminate or ease judicial oversight of searches, sei-
zures, and arrests. 6 The net effect of these cases is to withdraw
from Fourth Amendment coverage a broad range of police activi-
ty, to reduce the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment,
and to permit the police to use an assortment of pretextual en-
counters to validate otherwise unlawful intrusions. 7 It may be
that even absent the special pressures that have been generated
by the War on Drugs, the Court would eventually have reached
the same results, but it is hard to ignore the special weight given
to the "drug crisis" and the perceived needs of law enforcement in
this war. 8
See, for example, Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 Wm & Mary L Rev 197 (1993); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Bal-
ance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63
NYU L Rev 1173, 1181-82 (1988).
6 For a partial list of cases in which the Court sustained searches or seizures in the
drug enforcement context in the ten-year period of 1980-1990, see Alabama v White, 496
US 325 (1990); National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656 (1989); Skin-
ner v Railway Labor Executives'Association, 489 US 602 (1989); Florida v Riley, 488 US
445 (1989); United States v Dunn, 480 US 294 (1987); Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367
(1987); California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207 (1986); United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984);
Oliver v United States, 466 US 170 (1984); United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984);
Illinois v Andreas, 463 US 765 (1983); Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213 (1983); United States v
Knotts, 460 US 276 (1983); United States v Ross, 456 US 798 (1982); New York v Belton,
453 US 454 (1981); Rawlings v Kentucky, 448 US 98 (1980); United States v Mendenhall,
446 US 544 (1980).
17 See text at 249-51.
" In his reply to this Article, Professor Grano argues that many of the Court's crimi-
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Increasingly, enforcement on the street depends upon mak-
ing large numbers of stops and searches without the kind of indi-
vidualized justification normally required by the Fourth Amend-
ment, on the theory that the abundance of drugs in our society
will result in positive finds in a certain percentage of the
stops.19 This net ensnares the innocent and guilty alike, but it
has avoided critical scrutiny because the police have been correct
in their cynical assumptions: those who are stopped and searched
but found without drugs generally do not complain, and those
who are found with drugs have little or no credibility in court to
challenge the legality of the seizure and arrest.'0
nal-procedure decisions of the 1960's were wrong and that a retreat from them does not
mean that constitutional rights are being diluted. See Grano, 1994 U Chi Legal F at 303-
17 (cited in note 3). We fundamentally disagree over the intended privacy protections of
the Fourth Amendment, but whether this issue is viewed comparatively (what the Court
has actually changed in the past fifteen to twenty years) or normatively, I stand by the
assertion that we now enjoy unduly limited protections from governmental intrusions. It
is also worth noting that the Warren Court was not the first to find substantial privacy
protections in the Fourth Amendment. See, for example, Gouled v United States, 255 US
298 (1921); Weeks v United States, 232 US 383 (1914); Boyd v United States, 116 US 616
(1886).
"9 The use of drug courier profiles, random targeting of bus or train passengers to at-
tempt to gain consent for searches, and pretextual stops of cars, discussed below at 243-
53, are police policies specifically adopted for the War on Drugs. See, for example, Florida
v Bostick, 501 US 429 (1991); Unites Stated v Sokolow, 490 US 1 (1989).
2 Where the police intrusion is relatively moderate, the costs and difficulties of civil
litigation make a civil rights suit highly improbable. See David Rudovsky, Police Abuse:
Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev 465, 490-92 (1992); Maclin, 35 Wm
& Mary L Rev at 243-46 (cited in note 15).
On the issue of the resolving credibility on motions-to-suppress evidence, see Alan
Dershowitz, The Best Defense xxi-xxii (Random House, 1982):
The Rules of the Justice Game ...
Rule I: Almost all criminal defendants are, in fact, guilty.
Rule II: All criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors and judges understand and
believe Rule I.
Rule III: It is easier to convict guilty defendants by violating the Constitution
than by complying with it, and in some cases it is impossible to convict guilty
defendants without violating the Constitution.
Rule IV: Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in
order to convict guilty defendants.
Rule V: All prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys are aware of Rule IV.
Rule VI: Many prosecutors implicitly encourage police to lie about whether they
violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants.
Rule VII: All judges are aware of Rule VI.
Rule VIII: Most trial judges pretend to believe police officers who they know are
lying.
Rule IX: All appellate judges are aware of Rule VIII, yet many pretend to be-
lieve the trial judges who pretend to believe the lying police officers.
Rule X: Most judges disbelieve defendants about whether their constitutional
rights have been violated, even if they are telling the truth.
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The Fourth Amendment was adopted in large part in reac-
tion to the abuses of the English enforcement measures in the
colonies, including the notorious Writs of Assistance. 21 The
Writs of Assistance permitted British soldiers to enter colonial
residences to search for violations of the customs and duties
provisions.22 They were issued by agents of the Crown without a
showing of cause; no judicial authorization was required to
search a colonial residence.23 The Supreme Court has explained
the significance of the colonial experience in the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment:
These words are precise and clear. They reflect the de-
termination of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that
the people of this new Nation should forever "be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" from intru-
sion and seizure by officers acting under the unbridled
authority of a general warrant. Vivid in the memory of
the newly independent Americans were those general
warrants known as writs of assistance under which offi-
cers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The
hated writs of assistance had given customs officials
blanket authority to search where they pleased for
goods imported in violation of the British tax laws.
They were denounced by James Otis as "the worst in-
strument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law,
that ever was found in an English law book," because
they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer." The historic occasion of that denun-
ciation, in 1761 at Boston, has been characterized as
"perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated
the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the
mother country. 'Then and there,' said John Adams,
Rule XI: Most judges and prosecutors would not knowingly convict a defendant
who they believe to be innocent of the crime charged (or a closely related crime).
Rule XII: Rule XI does not apply to members of organized crime, drug dealers,
career criminals, or potential informers.
Rule XIII: Nobody really wants justice.
1 See Maurice Henry Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case 1-7 (University of Califor-
nia Press, 1978); Maclin, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 212 (cited in note 15); Marshall v
Barlow's, Inc., 436 US 307, 311 (1978); Stanford v Texas, 379 US 476, 481-82 (1965); Nel-
son B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution (De Capo Press, 1970).
2 See generally Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case (cited in note 21).
2' Id.
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'then and there was the first scene of the first act of
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born. '
One should understand that the Writs of Assistance were
neither irrational nor used solely to harass the colonists. In fact,
there were widespread violations of the customs laws, and the
colonists were engaged in a large-scale conspiracy to thwart the
collection of duties. It was predictable, therefore, that mass
searches would turn up evidence in a large number of cases.25
In some respects, the War on Drugs is the contemporary
equivalent of the Writs of Assistance. As I discuss below, drug
courier profile stops, random stops of bus and train passengers,
and pretextual car stops are based on the same underlying as-
sumptions that informed the English enforcement of the customs
provisions: widespread searches conducted without individualized
suspicion will produce evidence of criminal conduct. In both situ-
ations, it is law enforcement by serendipity; without cause that
any particular individual is involved in the drug trade, police use
group "profiles" or other broad-based criteria-the antithesis of
individualized cause-to effect stops and searches.26
A. Drug Courier Profile and Pretext Arrests: The Modern Writs
of Assistance
Law enforcement authorities have used drug courier profile
encounters as a weapon in the War on Drugs for the past twenty
years.2 ' Law enforcement authorities use drug courier profiles to
select which persons to stop and investigate as suspected drug
couriers in areas where large numbers of persons travel. 2' The
profile model is conceptually quite different from the model of
police investigation that relies upon individualized suspicion
based on specific information and observations as a predicate for
stops or searches. The profile model relies on factors that are not
' Stanford v Texas, 379 US 476, 481-82 (1965), quoting Boyd v United States, 116 US
616, 625 (1886).
See generally Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case (cited in note 21).
See Commonwealth v Lewis, 625 Pa 501, 512, 636 A2d 619, 625 (Pa 1994) ("The
facile reliance on drug courier profiles is reminiscent of the generalized suspicions histori-
cally used to justify the general warrants of the British."). See also text at 243-48.
" See Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile
and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 BU L Rev 843, 847-48 (1985).
' Id; United States v Sokolow, 490 US 1 (1989); Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier
Profile: "All Seems Infected that th' Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd
Eye", 65 NC L Rev 417 (1987).
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criminal in nature and that are usually characteristic of the ac-
tivities of law-abiding persons.29
Drug courier profiles are remarkably vague, indeterminate,
and overbroad. Judge George C. Pratt of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has correctly compared the use
of drug courier profiles to Alice-in-Wonderland logic.3 ° In a case
upholding a stop based on several of the drug courier profile
characteristics, Judge Pratt, in dissent, demonstrated the fluidity
of each factor. Judge Pratt began with the disputed "source city"
concept:
To justify their seizure of Hooper's bag the agents testi-
fied he had come from a "source city" and fit the DEA's
"drug courier profile". Yet the government conceded at
oral argument that a "source city" for drug traffic was
virtually any city with a major airport, a concession
that was met with deserved laughter in the court-
room.
31
Judge Pratt went on to discuss the "chameleon-like" nature of the
other profile factors.32 It is apparently significant if the suspect:
arrived late at night3 or early in the morning;34 was one of the
first to deplane 5 or one of the last to deplane; 8 used a one-way
ticket37 or a round-trip ticket; 8 carried brand-new luggage
39
or a small gym bag;4° travelled alone"' or with a companion;"'
acted nervously;43 wore expensive clothing and gold jewelry,"
or dressed in black corduroys, a white pullover shirt, and loafers
without socks,45 or in dark slacks, a work shirt, and a hat," or
Cloud, 65 BU L Rev at 852 (cited in note 27).
o United States v Hooper, 935 F2d 484, 499 (2d Cir 1991) (Pratt dissenting).
31 Id.
32 Id.
' United States v Nurse, 916 F2d 20, 24 (DC Cir 1990).
3' Reid v Georgia, 448 US 438, 441 (1980).
31 United States v Moore, 675 F2d 802, 803 (6th Cir 1982).
' United States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 547 n 1 (1980).
31 United States v Johnson, 910 F2d 1506, 1507 (7th Cir 1990).
31 United States v Craemer, 555 F2d 594, 595 (6th Cir 1977).
"' United States v Taylor, 917 F2d 1402, 1403 (6th Cir 1990).
10 United States v Sanford, 658 F2d 342, 343 (5th Cir 1981).
, United States v Smith, 574 F2d 882, 883 (6th Cir 1978).
" United States v Garcia, 905 F2d 557, 559 (1st Cir 1990).
United States v Montilla, 928 F2d 583, 585 (2d Cir 1991).
" United States v Chambers, 918 F2d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir 1990).
" United States v McKines, 933 F2d 1412, 1414 (8th Cir 1991).
48 Taylor, 917 F2d at 1403.
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in a brown leather aviator jacket, gold chain, with hair down to
the shoulders,47 or in a loose-fitting sweatshirt and denim jack-
et; and walked rapidly through the airport,49 or walked aim-
lessly through the airport.0
Given these imprecise and fluid characteristics, it is not sur-
prising that profile stops are extraordinarily overinclusive. Pro-
files encourage stops based on non-criminal behavior and person-
al appearance and include characteristics shared by a large num-
ber of innocent people. In the operations at the Buffalo Airport
discussed by Judge Pratt, the police were "correct" in their stops
in fewer than 2 percent of their profile encounters: of the six
hundred people stopped, only ten were carrying drugs.51 Similar
results typify other profile investigations.5 2 Yet the courts con-
tinue to credit these stops, rarely even considering the empirical
evidence to the contrary.
In part, the approval of profile stops is a predictable conse-
quence of the kinds of cases that actually reach the courts. For
the most part, judges see only those cases in which drugs or oth-
er contraband are seized. In these cases, enormous pressure ex-
ists to ignore constitutional violations, thereby preventing sup-
pression of the evidence. In the thousands of cases where the in-
dividual stopped is completely innocent, even if that person was
detained and searched illegally, it is unlikely that she will pursue
legal remedies." Thus, the case law develops on a highly
skewed notion of reality, subject to the distorting effect of the
discovery of contraband in the specific case.54
It is true that merely approaching someone to obtain infor-
mation is not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment unless it
would appear to a reasonable person that she was not free to
leave or to refuse to answer police inquiries.55 But the profile
4 United States v Milian, 912 F2d 1014, 1015 (8th Cir 1990).
United States v Flowers, 909 F2d 145, 146 (6th Cir 1990).
Millan, 912 F2d at 1017.
United States v Gomez-Norena, 908 F2d 497, 498 (9th Cir 1990).
5' Hooper, 935 F2d at 500.
52 See United States v Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US 531, 557 (1985) (Brennan dis-
senting); United States v Montilla, 733 F Supp 579, 580 (W D NY 1990) (eighty stops per
month, effecting three to four arrests). See also Cloud, 65 BU L Rev at 873-77 (cited in
note 27) (comparing with aircraft hijacker profile); Florida v Bostick, 501 US 429, 441-42
(1991) (Marshall dissenting).
See Maclin, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 244-45 (cited in note 15). See also note 20.
See, for example, Florida v Riley, 488 US 445, 463 (1989) (Brennan dissenting) ("It
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the plurality has allowed its analysis ... to be col-
ored by its distaste for the activity in which [the defendant was involved].").
See California v Hodari D., 499 US 621, 627-28 (1991).
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encounter is just the first step in the process. What often follows
is questioning designed to obtain "consent" or cause for a full
search.56 A disturbing example of the Court's willingness to
overlook coercive tactics is Florida v Bostick." Bostick involved
a search conducted by police officers who boarded a bus at an
intermediate stop on an interstate trip and, without any cause or
suspicion, selected Bostick and another passenger, both seated in
the back of the bus, as investigative targets.' One officer asked
Bostick for identification while another stood nearby, carrying a
pistol in a zipper pouch, the equivalent of carrying a gun in a
holster.59 After Bostick produced identification and his ticket
(which matched), the police requested permission to search his
luggage. 0 "Permission" was granted, and the search disclosed
narcotics in one of his suitcases.6'
The Supreme Court ruled that this police tactic ("working
the buses") was not per se unconstitutional.62 The Court found
no Fourth Amendment violation in police boarding buses and
targeting individuals without any cause or suspicion, because one
would not necessarily feel constrained by the police in this situa-
tion. 3 It is on this latter point that the Court's opinion, driven
by the exigencies of the War on Drugs, departs from reality.
Bostick, a black man, was confronted by armed police officers. He
was seated in the back of an interstate bus, at a stop in a remote
area, and could only leave by breaking the barrier created by the
officers. His choices were indeed limited. If he left the bus, he
would be stranded at that stop without his luggage. He was faced
with armed officers in a crowded area of the bus seeking to
search his belongings. To find that he was not seized (i.e., that he
reasonably believed he could leave) or that his permission was
fully voluntary and consensual is to drain those terms of any
meaning. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent:
This reasoning borders on sophism and trivializes
the values that underlie the Fourth Amendment. Obvi-
See United States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 557-58 (1980).
5' 501 US 429 (1991).
" Id at 431-33.
59 Id.
® Id.
61 Bostick, 501 US at 431-33.
62 Id at 440. It should be noted that questioning of bus passengers like that in Bostick
is even more random than airport profile stops, since the police have nothing other than a
pure hunch as to which passenger(s) they should approach. See id at 431-32.
'3 Id at 433-37.
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ously, a person's "voluntary decision" to place himself in
a room with only one exit does not authorize the police
to force an encounter upon him by placing themselves
in front of the exit. It is no more acceptable for the po-
lice to force an encounter on a person by exploiting his
"voluntary decision" to expose himself to perfectly legiti-
mate personal or social constraints. By consciously de-
ciding to single out persons who have undertaken inter-
state or intrastate travel, officers who conduct
suspicionless, dragnet-style sweeps put passengers to
the choice of cooperating or of exiting their buses and
possibly being stranded in unfamiliar locations. It is
exactly because this "choice" is no "choice" at all that
police engage this technique.
In my view, the Fourth Amendment clearly con-
demns the suspicionless, dragnet-style sweep of intra-
state or interstate buses. Withdrawing this particular
weapon from the government's drug-war arsenal would
hardly leave the police without any means of combat-
ting the use of buses as instrumentalities of the drug
trade. The police would remain free, for example, to
approach passengers whom they have a reasonable,
articulable basis to suspect of criminal wrongdoing. 4
The authorization to conduct sweeps of buses, airports, and
train stations is seemingly unlimited. As long as the initial en-
counter is not a "seizure" of the person, the basis for the stop is
immaterial. Theoretically, it cannot be based solely on race, but
as a practical matter racial motivation is very difficult to
prove." For example, in United States v Taylor,' the defen-
dant, who was "poorly attired," was the only black to emerge in
the initial group of passengers exiting from a plane that arrived
in Memphis from Miami.67 The Sixth Circuit decided that be-
cause the encounter that led to his arrest and conviction on co-
caine charges was "consensual," it did not need to consider
whether Taylor was stopped because of his race or whether the
Id at 450.
See, for example, United States v Travis, 837 F Supp 1386 (E D Ky 1993). See also
Bostick, 501 US at 441 n 1 (Marshall dissenting); Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and
Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick
v. Florida, 67 Tulane L Rev 1979 (1993);-text at 250-51.
956 F2d 572 (6th Cir 1992) (en banc).
Id at 574.
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incorporation of a racial component into the Drug Enforcement
Administration's ("DEA") drug courier profile would violate equal
protection and due process guarantees." The court did state
that if the defendant could show that he was targeted for a con-
sensual stop "because he was an African-American," or if the
police "implemented a general practice or pattern that primarily
targets minorities," equal protection would be implicated6 9 But
as the dissent demonstrated, the failure of the court to find racial
motivation on this record revealed an inadequate equal protec-
tion standard. °
The available evidence demonstrates the unreasonableness of
the sweep-and-profile techniques, both in concept and in result.
Thousands of wholly innocent travelers have been confronted by
armed police and have had their personal belongings subjected to
an intensive search.7" Furthermore, the percentage of successful
interdiction is often very low. In one case, officers "swept" one
hundred buses and effected only seven arrests.72 What appears
to be a police officer's magical "sixth sense" in a criminal case
arising from a successful interdiction is, in reality, the inevitable
and often isolated positive result of a search that was based on
nothing more than a hunch.73
Id at 578.
6' Id at 578-79. See also United States v Weaver, 966 F2d 391 (8th Cir 1992); Travis,
837 F Supp at 1392.
7 Taylor, 956 F2d at 581-83 (Keith dissenting). See also Jones v DEA, 819 F Supp
698, 723 (M D Tenn 1993); United States v Prandy.Binett, 995 F2d 1069, 1075 n 2 (DC Cir
1993) (Edwards dissenting).
71 Comment, The Drug Enforcement Agency's Use of Drug Courier Profiles: One Size
Fits All, 41 Cath U L Rev 943 (1992). Accord Becton, 65 NC L Rev at 417-18 (cited in note
28); Cloud, 65 BU L Rev at 847-48 (cited in note 27).
72 United States v Flowers, 912 F2d 707, 710 (4th Cir 1990).
" See Commonwealth v Jackson, 428 Pa Super 246, 251 n 2, 630 A2d 1231, 1233 n 2
(1993) (citations omitted):
Use of drug courier profiles has also been questioned since its ability to accu-
rately predict criminal activity and not intrude on citizens who are not engaging
in unlawful behavior has not been conclusively established. The sparse statisti-
cal data that has been reported hardly champions the continued application of
profiles. For instance, the Pittsburgh Press reported the results of Common
Pleas Judge Walter R. Little's order for an Allegheny County narcotics detective
to set forth statistics regarding the race of passengers he has investigated in his
2 and 1/2 years on the interdiction team. He reported that about fifty per cent of
the 96 travelers he has questioned or arrested have been black, six per cent
were Hispanic, and forty-four per cent were white. "Courts eye rights violations
by drug-busters at airport." Even more startling, however, is the pathetic lack of
success the profile reportedly had notwithstanding its repeated use. The same
article revealed that since July of 1988, police working the airport drug interdic-
tion unit interdicted 1,542 travelers and arrested 131 suspected drug couri-
ers-a mere eight per cent. Clearly, if these statistics are correct, the drug couri-
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There is yet another police tactic-the pretextual stop of au-
tomobiles-that is based on a rationale similar to that which ani-
mates drug courier profile stops. Police use traffic violation stops
as a way to gain consent, plain view, or other justification for a
search or seizure.74 Highway officers are encouraged to stop cars
on alleged traffic or motor vehicle offenses to establish the requi-
site cause to search for drugs.75 In many instances, the stop is
based on "profile" characteristics or is otherwise pretextual, done
with the expectation that in a certain number of cases the stop
will enable the officer to obtain consent, observe contraband in
plain view, or develop other cause for a search.76
Having stopped an automobile for an alleged traffic violation,
the police may, without any cause or suspicion, use dogs to sniff
the occupants and the vehicle to determine whether drugs are
present.77 Moreover, as in the bus, rail station, and airport sce-
narios, the police are free to attempt to secure consent for the
search. The problem here, of course, is determining after the fact
whether the police coerced the permission or whether it was
gained voluntarily. And, where drugs are found and the issue
must be determined in a suppression context, the pressures to
credit the police version are significant.
er profile has not resulted in an overwhelming increase of successful investigato-
ry stops and arrests.
See also Travis, 837 F Supp at 1389-91; United States v Hooper, 935 F2d 484, 499 (2d Cir
1991) (Pratt dissenting).
7' The courts have addressed pretextual stops and arrests in different ways. There is
no dispute that where an officer misrepresents the factors upon which the stop was based
(by stating, for example, that a traffic violation occurred when it had not), even if a court
describes the action as "pretextual," the stop is in clear violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See John M. Burkhoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 NYU L Rev 70, 86 (1982). On the
other hand, where there is a factual basis for the stop, but the purpose of the stop is pri-
marily to obtain evidence unrelated to the legal justification for the stop (for example, a
traffic violation stop to try to get consent to search for drugs), it is not clear whether this
.pretext" is valid under the Fourth Amendment. See generally Comment, Pretext Searches
and the Fourth Amendment: Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137 U Pa L Rev 1791
(1989); John M. Burkhoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't,
17 U Mich J L Ref 523 (1984).
See Pennsylvania State Police, Operation White Line: A Highway Interdiction Pro-
gram (Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Drug Law Enforcement Division). See Common-
wealth v Valenzuela, 408 Pa Super 398, 404, 597 A2d 93, 96 n 1 (1991)
7' Cloud, 65 BU L Rev at 854-55, 875-76 (cited in note 27).
. See, for example, United States v Place, 462 US 696, 707 (1983). State courts, ap-
plying their own Constitutions, have increasingly granted individuals more privacy
protections. See, for example, Commonwealth v Martin, 534 Pa 136, 143-44, 626 A2d 556,
560 (Pa 1993) (holding that a dog sniff of a person or personal items requires probable
cause). See text at 263.
250 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1994:
Defendants' claims that they were targeted because of race
or alienage, that consent was coerced, or that the search was
made with no consent are, as noted above, not always treated
fairly in the criminal prosecution context. Occasionally, however,
litigation offers a larger perspective of the practices involved. A
federal district court has certified a class action on the issues of
whether police are stopping motorists on Interstate 95 near Phil-
adelphia without cause, on the basis of race, and whether search-
es of the cars are being conducted by coerced consent." Civil
discovery rules have enabled the plaintiffs to obtain records of
stops of motorists by the township's police department. These
documents and follow-up interviews with persons subjected to
these stops reveal several problematic characteristics of these
stops. First, the interdiction program is based on the power to
make a pretextual traffic stop.79 Numerous vehicles have been
stopped, for example, for having small items tied to their rear-
view mirrors, for outdated inspection stickers, or for other minor
violations, all supposedly observed as the car passed the police at
sixty miles per hour.80 Second, the stops are racially dispropor-
tionate.8 Third, claims of consent are rebutted by numerous
innocent individuals who give consistent accounts of being told
that they would have to wait for a police dog, have their car
towed, or suffer other types of roadside detention unless they
consented to a search." Finally, a significant number of those
stopped claim that the police searched without any permission
whatsoever."
These discovery results are not unique. In Volusia County,
Florida, videotapes and other documents relating to stops on In-
terstate 95, made by the Sheriffs drug squad, disclosed that
highway stops were based in large measure on the race of the
driver.' Seventy percent of the motorists stopped were black or
70 Wilson v Tinicum Township, 1993 WL 280205 (E D Pa 1992).
7' See discovery material in Wilson v Tinicum, 1993 WL 280205 (E D Pa 1992) (on
file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
See discovery material in Wilson (cited in note 79).
01 See discovery material in Wilson (cited in note 79). Of all cars stopped in which the
records indicate the race of the driver, over 60 percent were of racial minorities. Of all
persons searched, over 70 percent were racial minorities.
02 See discovery material in Wilson (cited in note 79). See also Plaintiffs Motion for
Class Certification and Memorandum of Law in Wilson (on file with the University of Chi-
cago Legal Forum).
See discovery material in Wilson (cited in note 79); Plaintiffs Brief in Wilson.
Jeff Brazil and Steve Berry, Color of Driver Is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos, Orlando
Sentinel Al (Aug 23, 1992).*
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Hispanic; 80 percent of the cars that were searched were driven
by blacks or Hispanics; only 1 percent of those stopped received a
traffic citation; and over five hundred motorists were subjected to
searches and frisks without any cause or suspicion.85 By com-
parison, only 5 percent of the drivers on this stretch of Interstate
95 were black or Hispanic, and only 15 percent of all persons con-
victed in Florida for traffic violations during this period were of a
minority race."
The practice of using pretextual stops has been validated by
most federal courts, thus giving the police a largely unreviewable
way to avoid Fourth Amendment scrutiny.87 The courts justify
this approach by citing the objective reasonableness of the stops:
as long as there was cause for the police action, it does not mat-
ter that the police were using their powers as a pretext to con-
duct a drug investigation that was at the time unsupported by
cause or suspicion.' The Supreme Court's acceptance of
pretextual stops, searches, and detentions pretermits most chal-
lenges to the highly random and, in many circumstances, arbi-
trary targeting of persons. It does not matter that the ultimate
purpose of the police action has nothing to do with the "legal"
reason for the intrusion and everything to do with the search for
drugs. Whatever the correct doctrinal interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment on this issue, it must at least be recognized
that the pretext doctrine, as currently interpreted, sanctions
search and seizure practices that can be conducted without indi-
vidualized suspicion or cause.
The Supreme Court has also sanctioned searches of thou-
sands of innocent persons without cause, suspicion, or judicial
warrant. To augment drug detection and drug enforcement poli-
cies, drug testing in the workplace has become a popular mea-
sure for both governmental and private employers.89 This pro-
cess involves targeting entire groups of persons, most of whom
we know will be free of drugs. The Supreme Court has sustained
86 Id.
Id.
87 See, for example, United States v Trigg, 878 F2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir 1989); United
States v Causey, 834 F2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir 1987) (en banc); United States v Hawkins,
811 F2d 210, 213 (3d Cir 1987); Comment, 137 U Pa L Rev at 1791 (cited in note 74). One
case that limits the use of pretextual stops or arrests is United States v Guzman, 864 F2d
1512, 1516-17 (10th Cir 1988).
See Trigg, 878 F2d at 1040-41; Hawkins, 811 F2d at 215; Causey, 834 F2d at 1183-
84.
8 See Skinner v Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 US 602, 618-21 (1989);
National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656, 665-66 (1989).
252 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1994:
drug testing of employees without suspicion or any particularized
evidence of improper drug use on the "special needs" exception to
the Fourth Amendment," thus creating a broad range of
searches that are exempt from any meaningful constitutional
scrutiny.9 Analysis of the drug-testing opinions makes clear the
impact that the War on Drugs has had on the fundamental shift
from the insistence on cause and prior judicial approval to Execu-
tive and legislatively authorized suspicionless searches and sei-
zures of entire classes of persons.2 Justice Scalia, dissenting in
National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab,93 succinctly
exposed the flaws in the Court's approach:
The only plausible explanation [for the drug-testing
rules] ... [is that] 'if a law enforcement agency and its
employees do not take the law seriously, neither will
the public on which the agency's effectiveness depends.'
What better way to show that the Government is seri-
ous about its 'war on drugs' than to subject its employ-
ees on the front line of that war to this invasion of their
privacy and affront to their dignity? To be sure, there is
only a slight chance that it will prevent some serious
public harm resulting from Service employee drug use,
but it will show to the world that the Service is 'clean,'
and-most important of all-will demonstrate the deter-
mination of the Government to eliminate this scourge of
our society! I think it obvious that this justification is
unacceptable; that the impairment of individual liber-
ties cannot be the means of making a point; that sym-
bolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the
abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an other-
wise unreasonable search.94
The Fourth Amendment has always allowed law enforcement
officials substantial discretion in the investigation of criminal
activity. The requirements of cause and judicial warrants place
Skinner, 489 US at 618-21; Von Raab, 489 US at 665-66.
Skinner, 489 US at 618-21; Von Raab, 489 US at 665-66. See also Morgan Cloud,
Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L Rev
199, 236-244 (1993).
92 Skinner, 489 US at 618-21; Von Raab, 489 US at 665-66. See also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 S Ct Rev
87.
489 US 656, 665-66 (1989).
Id at 686-87 (Scalia dissenting) (citations omitted).
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important, but not onerous,. limitations on police power. The
Court's enthusiastic embrace of the tactics that police have devel-
oped in the War on Drugs-profile and pretextual stops, sweeps
of buses, drug testing without suspicion-abruptly upsets the bal-
ance previously struck. No longer is individualized cause or sus-
picion the hallmark of the Fourth Amendment. Today, simply
fitting the vague contour of profiles or police hunches justifies
intrusions on personal privacy.
B. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: A Doctrine of Infinite
Malleability
In Katz v United States,95 the Court ruled that the "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."96 In this case, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation recorded telephone conversations
made by the petitioner from a public telephone. 7 Earlier cases
had established that a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment occurs only when government officials physically
invade a "constitutionally protected area" such as one's person,
house, papers, and effects. 8 Katz rejected the limited scope of
previous decisions, stating that the "correct solution of Fourth
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation
of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area'."99 Justice Harlan,
in an influential concurring opinion, found the Fourth Amend-
ment applicable "if a person ... exhibit[s] an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and . . . [if] the expectation [is] one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'."'00
By redefining the basis upon which it can be said that a
search and seizure has taken place, the Court expanded Fourth
Amendment protections. The "reasonable expectation of privacy"
inquiry was heralded as a "watershed in Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence" and rapidly became the basis of a new formula of
Fourth Amendment protections. 10' It did not take long, howev-
er, for a differently constituted Court to manipulate Katz to limit
privacy rights. Applying notions of "assumption of the risk" and
' 389 US 347 (1967).
96 Id at 351.
' See Katz v United States, 369 F2d 130, 131 (9th Cir 1966).
See, for example, Lopez v United States, 373 US 427, 438-39 (1963); Silverman v
United States, 365 US 505, 510-11 (1961).
'9 Katz, 389 US at 350.
"" Id at 361 (Harlan concurring).
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn L
Rev 349, 382 (1974).
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"knowing exposure" of information or conduct, the Court severely
limited both the physical areas and personal conduct entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.0 2
In Smith v Maryland,0 3 the Court concluded that one does
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers one
dials on the telephone in one's home. °4 One is not entitled to
expect these numbers to remain confidential because "[wihen he
used his phone, [Smith] voluntarily conveyed numerical informa-
tion to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to
its equipment in the ordinary course of business." 15 Smith "as-
sumed the risk" that the company would reveal this information
to law enforcement officers."0 8 Of course, Smith did not intend
his disclosure to the phone company to be a disclosure to the
government. Nonetheless, because of Smith's "knowing exposure,"
the installation and use of a pen, register specifically for criminal
investigations was deemed not to be a "search," and therefore no
warrant was required.107
In California v Greenwood, °8 the Court ruled that persons
who leave their garbage out on the curb for public collection have
"exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their
claim to Fourth Amendment protection."" 9 This result was
based on the
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or
at the side of a public street are readily accessible to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other mem-
bers of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their
refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying
it to a third party, the trash collector, who might him-
self have sorted through respondents' trash or permit-
ted others, such as the police, to do so."0
This reasoning is both myopic and mystifying. Initially, it
should be noted that trash can contain the most private and em-
barrassing information, including highly personal writings and
102 See text at 256-59.
103 442 US 735 (1979).
"' Id at 742-43.
5 Id at 744.
106 Id.
o Smith, 442 US at 744-45.
10' 486 US 35 (1988).
09 Id at 40.
110 Id.
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financial records, material that may have the highest privacy
value. The fact that other people may steal, vandalize, or enter
our property to take this material can hardly provide legitimate
grounds for permitting the police to do the same. Furthermore,
there may be no other legal or practical way to dispose of trash.
The CIA and the FBI are well-equipped with burn bags and so-
phisticated paper shredders, but most citizens would be hard
pressed to take these extravagant steps to protect their privacy.
But even assuming that there was in Greenwood a disclosure to
others who might sort through the trash, do we as a society not
have a reasonable expectation that the police will not do so?
It is also unnecessary to obtain a warrant before employing
airplanes and helicopters to investigate conduct that is hidden
from ground-level observation but is in plain view from the air.
California v Ciraolo..' upheld the warrantless aerial surveil-
lance at an altitude of 1,000 feet of marijuana plants growing in
the enclosed backyard of a private residence."' Although the
homeowner had purposefully shielded his yard from public view
by erecting a ten-foot fence around his property, and although he
clearly expected that his privacy would be preserved, the Court
found an expectation of privacy from all observations (that is,
those made from the sky) to be unreasonable."' The expecta-
tion was unreasonable because "a 10 foot fence might not shield
these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on
the top of a truck or a two-level bus." 4
According to the Court, Ciraolo's expectation that his garden
would be protected from aerial observation was simply not one
that society is prepared to recognize.' This is because the offi-
cers could have made naked-eye observations from publicly navi-
gable airspace, and "[any member of the public flying in this air-
space who glanced down could have seen everything that [the]
officers observed.""6 Relying on general knowledge of the fre-
quency of private and commercial air traffic, the Court refused to
interpret the Fourth Amendment as demanding that "police trav-
elling in the public airways at [1,000 feet] obtain a warrant in
order to observe what is visible to the naked eye."" 7
.. 476 US 207 (1986).
... Id at 215.
1 Id at 212-15.
Id at 211 (emphasis added).
" Ciraolo, 476 US at 213-14.
"' Id (emphasis added).
117 Id at 215.
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Authority to use aerial surveillance was extended in Florida
v Riley,"' which held that helicopter surveillance of a partially
covered greenhouse at an altitude of only 400 feet was not a
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment."9 Even though
the defendant clearly intended to exclude public observation of
his greenhouse by enclosing the sides and roof, his expectation of
privacy was defeated by the fact that two of the roofing panels
(about one-tenth of the roof) were dislodged and exposed the inte-
rior. 2 The helicopter enabled the police to peer through and
detect marijuana plants growing inside.'21
The Court's analysis of the privacy component of the Fourth
Amendment is based almost entirely on the actions of the indi-
vidual, namely whether she completely excluded any possibility
of others viewing her property. According to the Court, the pur-
pose of the government agent is irrelevant. Thus, the Court holds
as one and the same the intentional view of one's home, yard, or
trash by a police officer deliberately seeking evidence of a crime
and the possibility that an airline passenger at 25,000 feet would
make the same observations or that a street person would rum-
mage through one's trash. This view disregards the Fourth
Amendment's special role in limiting official invasions of privacy.
It is difficult to perceive the basis-other than an uncritical def-
erence to law enforcement's efforts in the drug war-upon which
the Court makes the legal/social judgment that our private activi-
ties, including perfectly innocent and intimate conduct, should
not be protected from governmental snooping because we have
failed to draw our curtains tightly, to cover every skylight in our
house, or (impossibly) to cover our backyards.'22
The Court's opinion in Oliver v United States'23 demon-
strates just how far the Court has departed from the privacy-
enhancing principles of Katz. Oliver owned a 2,000 acre farm.
The police, acting on an anonymous tip that Oliver was cultivat-
ing marijuana in his fields, entered his property without a war-
rant. "'24 They ignored a "No-Trespassing" sign and proceeded
.. 488 US 445 (1989).
119 Id.
12 Id at 447-50.
121 Id at 448-50.
12 For an empirical analysis of the Court's approach, see Christopher Slobogin and
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understanding Recognized and Permitted By
Society", 42 Duke L J 727 (1993).
2 466 US 170 (1984).
'24 Id at 173.
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down a private road on the property.'25 Near Oliver's house
they walked around a fence and gate and looked inside a parked
camper situated on the property.'26 They eventually found a
field of marijuana on Oliver's property, over a mile from his
house. 12
7
Applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the
Court rejected Oliver's claim of a Fourth Amendment violation,
ruling that "open fields do not provide the setting for those inti-
mate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from
government interference or surveillance." 2 ' As Professor
Saltzburg has commented, this is pure "ipse dixit."'29 Oliver did
not claim that all "open fields" were protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Instead, consistent with Katz, he claimed that his
fields were not in fact open and, therefore, were entitled to priva-
cy protections. 30 Oliver had done everything in his power to
preserve his privacy interests, including posting "No-Trespassing"
signs, using fences and gates, and keeping his property secluded
from the general public.'3' Oliver did nothing to disclose his ac-
tivities and manifested a clear intent to keep unauthorized visi-
tors from traversing his land.'32 Thus, Oliver had done exactly
what Katz did when he closed the door to the public telephone
booth: both Oliver and Katz sought, however imperfectly, to ex-
clude the public from their private affairs.
To avoid applying privacy principles in Oliver, the Court dis-
torted both the record and judicial doctrine. The Court rational-
ized its conclusion that Oliver had no privacy interest in his
fields by asserting that the area could be viewed from an air-
plane, disregarding the fact that there was no evidence that the
marijuana in the field in question could actually have been seen
from the air. 3 If exposure to a determined snooper is sufficient
to defeat a privacy interest, then Katz is wrongly decided, be-
cause a lipreader could determine what Katz was saying.
Unwittingly, the Court revealed its true stance when it con-
cluded that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to "shelter
125 Id.
12 Id.
"' Oliver, 466 US at 173.
'2 Id at 179.
" Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment
(As Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U Pitt L Rev 1, 13 (1986).
'3 See Oliver, 466 US at 182-183.
'3' Id at 182.
132 Id.
133 Id at 179.
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criminal activity... [by the] erect[ion of) barriers and [the]
post[ing of] 'No Trespassing' signs."3 4 In fact, the opposite is
true: the Fourth Amendment should be understood as a qualified
"shelter" of all activity, criminal and innocent alike, that may
only be breached with the requisite showing of cause and prior
judicial approval. If one's land or fields should be treated differ-
ently than one's home or possessions, then the Court should pro-
vide a principled reason for this distinction. And if the Court is
correct, then police can break down fences and roam freely on
private property. It is difficult to believe that this reflects what
our society would consider reasonable.
C. Reducing Privacy by Definitional and Doctrinal Devices
By adopting a relatively narrow definition of what consti-
tutes a search or seizure, the Court has placed another set of ar-
bitrary practices by the police outside the parameters of the
Fourth Amendment. In California v Hodari D.,'35 the Court
ruled that a police chase and "cornering" of a suspect, made with-
out the cause or suspicion necessary to effect a forcible stop, was
not grounds to suppress evidence discarded by the suspect during
a chase because there had been no "seizure" under the Fourth
Amendment at the time the defendant threw the evidence.'36
The Court had previously ruled that a "seizure" of the person
occurs when the suspect would reasonably believe that he was
not free to leave.137 Of course, by requiring an actual physical
seizure (or submission to authority), the Court can avoid Fourth
Amendment consequences for a range of police conduct that was
unjustified from its inception.
Hodari D. reflects the Court's narrow, "atomistic" view of the
Fourth Amendment.'38 By focusing on the question of whether
an individual was physically seized, the Court permits a range of
police practices that are offensive to Fourth Amendment values.
For example, in Hodari D., if the suspect had acquiesced in the
Oliver, 446 US at 182 n 13.
499 US 621 (1991).
" Id at 629.
... In United States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion), Justice
Stewart wrote that "[a] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reason-
able person would have believed that he was not free to leave." See also Michigan v
Chesternut, 486 US 567, 573 (1988).
1" For a discussion of the atomistic view of the Fourth Amendment, see Amsterdam,
58 Minn L Rev at 367-72 (cited in note 101).
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police show of authority, then any evidence obtained would have
been unlawful as a product of the unlawful seizure. 139 It makes
little sense for the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to turn
on this fortuitous factor when the purpose of the Amendment is
to limit certain kinds of police practices without particular refer-
ence to the reaction of a suspect. "
Indeed, where it suits the Court's agenda of limiting Fourth
Amendment protections, the Court has not hesitated to reject the
individual-rights model to stress the importance of regulation
and deterrence. Thus, in several areas, including grand jury pro-
ceedings,"" habeas corpus actions,'42 and "good faith" applica-
tions for search warrants,1 3 the Court has refused any remedy
for constitutional violations on the theory that deterrence would
not be served. Whether or not a unified theory of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is possible, the Court's current approach is
entirely unsatisfactory; it is highly result-oriented and organized
emphatically to expand governmental power of investigation.
In United States v Leon,'" the Court adopted a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in search warrant cases. "5
The Court ruled that even when a search warrant fails to state
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment does not require that the
evidence be suppressed if the officer who secured the warrant be-
lieved in reasonable good faith that the facts asserted were suffi-
cient to establish probable cause. " 6 Just one year before Leon,
in Illinois v Gates,47 another drug case, the Court redefined the
standards for assessing whether a warrant states probable cause,
adopting a "totality of the circumstances" test that permits a
magistrate to issue a warrant where there is a "fair probability"
to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found. 4 ' Furthermore, the Court limited the review powers of
the district court on suppression motions to determining whether
13 The Court decided the case on the assumption that the defendant's flight did not
provide reasonable suspicion for a forcible stop. Hodari D., 499 US at 623 n 1. Therefore,
any evidence secured would be suppressed as a fruit of an illegal stop. Id at 623-24.
14 See Amsterdam, 58 Minn L Rev at 368-69 (cited in note 101).
' United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 351 (1974).
1 Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 486-88 (1976).
"s United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906-08 (1984).
-4 68 US 897 (1984).
"5 Id at 922-24.
'4' Id at 919-20.
14 462 US 213 (1983).
"' Id at 238-39.
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the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for issuing the war-
rant. '4
Gates reduced the level of cause required to issue search
warrants, first by relaxing the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged
test 50  and, second, by limiting judicial review of the
magistrate's determination.'51 Thus, Gates and Leon provided
the police with a two-step discount from historically established
standards of probable cause. Now, as long as a court can deter-
mine that the magistrate who issued the warrant had a "substan-
tial basis" for believing that cause existed and that a reasonable
officer could have believed that probable cause was stated-a
standard that permits searches on not much more than the bar-
est suspicion-the warrant will be sustained.'52
What should not be lost in the debates over the exclusionary
rule and judicial review of police practices is the practical effect
that the doctrine of good faith will have on the substance of con-
stitutional rights. Where judicial remedies for conduct that vio-
lates Fourth Amendment standards are withdrawn, the operative
standard (that is, the one followed by the police) will be some-
thing far short of probable cause. The results in these cases are
defended on the ground that suppression of highly relevant evi-
dence is not justified where police have acted in good faith or
where it is unlikely that the goal of deterrence will be served.'
Applying a cost-benefit analysis, the Court can easily subordinate
privacy values to the demands of law enforcement.' This cost-
benefit approach has generated a good deal of debate, and a
9 Id .
150 See Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 (1964); Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410
(1969). Under the two-pronged test, the warrant was valid only if the affidavit indepen-
dently demonstrated the reliability of the informer and the factual basis for the informer's
assertions.
"' Gates, 462 US at 236-37.
12 See United States v Pless, 982 F2d 1118, 1124 (7th Cir 1992) (stating that "the
standard of review for such probable cause determinations [is] . . .affirmance absent clear
error by the issuing magistrate"). See also United States v Spinosa, 982 F2d 620, 625-26
(1st Cir 1992).
... See Leon, 468 US at 922; Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government
Work". The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 S Ct Rev 309; Craig M. Bradley, The
"Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 Ind L J 287 (1985);
Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 Yale L J 906 (1986); Steven Duke, Making Leon
Worse, 95 Yale L J 1405 (1986); Joel J. Finer, Gates, Leon, and the Compromise of Adjudi-
cative Fairness (Part I): A Dialogue on Prejudicial Concurrences, 33 Cleve St L Rev 707
(1984-1985); Joel J. Finer, Gates, Leon, and the Compromise of Adjudicative Fairness
(Part II): Of Aggressive Majoritarianism, Willful Deafness, and the New Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 34 Cleve St L Rev 199 (1985-1986).
" See Cloud, 41 UCLA L Rev at 199 (cited in note 91).
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strong case has been made that it is an inappropriate jurispru-
dential tool in the Fourth Amendment setting.155 But whatever
the merits of that issue, there is strong reason to be skeptical of
those who attack the suppression remedy on cost-benefit grounds
while still expressing allegiance to the principles of the Fourth
Amendment. If the true concern was simply to avoid suppressing
evidence at criminal trials, but at the same time to protect the
values of the Fourth Amendment, then one would expect that
other remedies for constitutional violations would be strength-
ened. To the contrary, however, the courts, at the urging of law
enforcement officials, have significantly restricted civil remedies
for constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has granted ab-
solute immunity from suit to judges 5 ' and prosecutors"5 7 for
any actions taken in their official roles, and it has provided a
qualified immunity from damages liability to police officers,
thereby insulating them from suit for a wide range of illegal con-
duct. 5' The Court has also placed severe restrictions on injunc-
tive actions"5 9 and has limited recovery from governmental enti-
ties.160 Accordingly, civil remedies provide quite limited means
to enforce the Fourth Amendment.'
" See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Eco-
nomic Efficiency?, 98 Harv L Rev 592 (1985).
'" See, for example, Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 349, 355-57 (1978); Pierson v Ray,
386 US 547, 555-57 (1967).
157 See, for example, Buckley v Fitzsimmons, 113 S Ct 2606, 2615-17 (1993); Imbler v
Pachtman, 424 US 409, 421 (1976).
16 See, for example, Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 638-41 (1987); Harlow v Fitz-
gerald, 457 US 800, 807 (1982). See also David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doc-
trine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights,
138 U Pa L Rev 23 (1989).
" See, for example, City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95, 101 (1983); Rizzo v
Goode, 423 US 362 (1976).
" See, for example, City of Canton v Harris, 489 US 378 (1989); City of St. Louis v
Praprotnik, 485 US 112, 128 (1988) (plurality opinion). As a practical matter, if the gov-
ernmental employer is not liable, there may be significant difficulty in collecting a judg-
ment from the individual officer, thus providing a disincentive to sue.
- In recent years, there have been serious complaints concerning the manner in
which drug raids are conducted. In documented cases, police ignore knock-and-announce
requirements, storm houses in the early morning hours with heavily armed officers, ter-
rorize the occupants, including those who are entirely innocent, and destroy property. See,
for example, Sara Rimer, Minister Who Sought Peace Dies in a Botched Drug Raid, NY
Times Al (Mar 28, 1994); McDonald v Haskins, 966 F2d 292 (7th Cir 1992). Unfortunate-
ly, even in these situations, remedies are restricted. See generally Rudovsky, 27 Harv CR-
CL L Rev 465 (cited in note 20). Even more troubling is the widespread acceptance of
these tactics, a reaction that is molded by the "war theory" and the fact that these raids
occur almost exclusively in poor and minority communities.
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If we were able to calibrate perfectly a range of effective de-
terrents to improper arrests, searches, and seizures (through
measures like civil penalties and internal discipline) so that no
violations of the Fourth Amendment occurred, there would be no
need for an exclusionary rule, since no evidence would be tainted
by a constitutional violation. Privacy would in some circumstanc-
es trump "truth," which is exactly the consequence envisioned by
the Fourth Amendment. The exclusionary rule is an easy target
for those whose real dispute is with the Fourth Amendment it-
self.16
2
The Court's decisions in the criminal context cannot be ex-
plained as a good faith attempt to limit the costs of the
exclusionary rule. The Court's agenda is far more ambitious; it is
grounded in the notion that constitutional rights, and not just
remedies, must be curtailed in the War on Drugs. Taken in com-
bination, the Court's decisions in the search and seizure field
leave the Fourth Amendment as little more than an honor code,
stripped of substantive protections, with its constitutional values
to be determined by the very forces it was meant to control.
There is more than historical irony to this development. The no-
tion that the reduction of privacy protections is a necessary com-
ponent of the War on Drugs is false, and the implicit promise
that restricting individual rights will make us safer is illusory.
We are no safer from the ravages of drugs, but we are far less
secure from arbitrary government practices.
There is another related and significant judicial development
in this area that bears some discussion. In reaction to the Su-
preme Court's conservative criminal justice jurisprudence, state
courts have developed state constitutional theories to provide
more -protection to privacy and other constitutional rights.163
Some jurisdictions have wholly defected from the constitutional
doctrines articulated by the United States Supreme Court.'
The manifestations of federal/state judicial conflict over the
interpretation of constitutional provisions have been particularly
182 See Yale Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 Judicature 66 (1978); Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum L Rev 1365 (1983).
'"' See, for example, William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv L Rev 489 (1977); Leonard Sosnov, Criminal Procedure Rights
Under the Pennsylvania Constitution: Examining the Present and Exploring the Future, 3
Widener J Pub L 217 (1993).
18 See id.
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sharp in the Fourth Amendment area. The most fundamental
questions that the Supreme Court has addressed-the scope of
the Amendment's coverage, the application of the exclusionary
rule, and the theoretical underpinnings of the Amendment-have
all been independently examined, and in many cases resolved
differently, by state courts.'65 Just as significantly, state courts
are beginning to question the consequences of the War on Drugs
on constitutional doctrine. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recently stated:
We are mindful that government has a compelling in-
terest in eliminating the flow of illegal drugs into our
society, and we do not seek to frustrate the effort to rid
society of this scourge. But all things are not permissi-
ble even in the pursuit of a compelling state interest.
The Constitution does not cease to exist merely because
the government's interest is compelling. A police state
does not arise whenever crime gets out of hand. In fact,
all today's holding requires is what police should them-
selves insist on: probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed or contraband is to be found before
there is a police intrusion .... [A] free society cannot
remain free if police may use drug detection dogs or any
other crime detection device without restraint. The re-
straint which we today impose on the use of drug detec-
tion dog searches of persons is modest enough, in light
of our constitutional mandate.'
Given the politicized state of constitutional decisionmaking,
it is perhaps inevitable that differences would evolve in the ap-
plication of federal and state constitutional guarantees. But the
fact that the most intense differences have emerged on Fourth
Amendment issues demonstrates from another vantage point the
potent and pervasive impact of the War on Drugs.
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: THE LAWYER AS THE PROBLEM
As we have seen, the Court has provided the police with ex-
traordinary powers of investigation, search, and seizure. At the
same time, Congress has greatly expanded the reach of criminal
statutes used to prosecute drug offenses."" Not content with
' See id.
Commonwealth v Martin, 534 Pa 136, 144, 626 A2d 556, 561 (1993).
167 See, for example, 18 USC §§ 1956-57 (1988) (establishing criminal sanctions for
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these changes, the government has opened another front in the
War on Drugs-this one aimed at defense lawyers. In the past
decade, prosecutors have moved to restrict the zealous advocacy
of criminal defense attorneys (and particularly those engaged to
represent persons charged in major drug cases), defending their
tactics as nothing more than even-handed treatment of lawyers
who are suspected of illegal or unethical conduct.16 There is
growing concern, however, that there is an improper ideological
motivation for these measures, one that is grounded in the belief
that the criminal defense lawyer is part of the enemy camp.169
The attack on the right to counsel has involved several strat-
egies. First, a dramatic increase has occurred in the use of grand
jury subpoenas to lawyers for information relating to clients, in-
cluding clients currently under criminal investigation or indict-
ment. 7 ' When they enforce these subpoenas, the courts give in-
sufficient weight to the burdens they place on the attorney-client
relationship.
Second, the government and the courts have developed high-
ly differentiated ethical standards for prosecutors and defense
lawyers. Federal prosecutors claim the right to exempt them-
selves from state ethical rules that forbid contact with persons
represented by counsel and from issuing subpoenas to lawyers
without prior judicial approval. 71 Prosecutors also seek to dis-
currency violations and for failing to meet reporting requirements for certain financial
transactions); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 USC §§ 1961-68 (1988) (providing
penalties for a pattern of racketeering activities, including certain drug-related offenses);
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 USC §§ 3141-43 (1988) (permitting preventive detention in
certain drug cases); 21 USC § 848 (1988) (enhancing penalties for certain criminal enter-
prises); 21 USC § 853 (1988) (permitting criminal forfeiture of property derived from ille-
gal drug transactions).
" See Symposium, Limitations on the Effectiveness of Criminal Defense Counsel, 136
U Pa L Rev 1779 (1988).
169 Id.
170 See, for example, United States v Klubock, 832 F2d 664, 667 (1st Cir 1987) (en
banc) (upholding a local court rule requiring prior judicial approval before grand jury sub-
poenas can be served on criminal defense attorneys in order to regulate prosecutorial ac-
tion); Baylson v Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 975 F2d 102,
109-11 (3d Cir 1992); In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F2d 13 (1st Cir 1984) (granting a mo-
tion to quash the grand jury subpoena of a defense attorney's testimony concerning the
arrangements with a client). See also Max D. Stern and David Hoffman, Privileged In.
formers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U Pa L Rev
1783, 1787-88 (1988) (finding a substantial increase in subpoenas to lawyers between
1983 and 1985).
17 See, for example, United States Department of Justice, Communications With Rep-
resented Persons, 59 Fed Reg 10086, 10088 (Mar 3, 1994) (amending 28 CFR § 77); Unit-
ed States v Lopez, 989 F2d 1032 (9th Cir 1993); United States v Ferrara, 1993 WL 405477
(D DC 1993); Baylson, 975 F2d at 112-13.
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qualify defense counsel on asserted conflicts of interest even
where clients waive this right and where the prosecutors' princi-
pal motive is to divide defendants, thereby enabling the govern-
ment to use one or more defendants as prosecution witnesses.
17 2
Prosecutors have even wired lawyers to record conversations with
their clients.17 3 For the most part, the courts have upheld these
practices, mechanically subordinating the rights of defendants to
"compelling interests" of the government.174 One need not quar-
rel with the government's legitimate interest in regulating or
prosecuting corrupt lawyers to realize also that these practices
reflect an attitude that vigorous advocacy of constitutional rights
is in part to blame for our high levels of crime.
Illustrative of the new restrictions is the practice of fee for-
feiture. Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (the
"CFA),"75 a court, upon motion of the government, may issue a
restraining order that prohibits a criminal defendant from dis-
bursing assets that derive from certain criminal activity. The re-
lation-back provision of the CFA allows the government to seek a
post-conviction forfeiture of property transferred to a third per-
son, including counsel fees.'76 Under the CFA, the mere allega-
tion in the indictment that the defendant has assets that derive
from, or are the proceeds of, certain criminal enterprises allows
the government to seek an ex parte restraining order to prevent
the defendant from disposing of those assets.77 Lawyers are
thus on notice that if they lose the case, their fee can be forfeited
to the government. Thus, by the power of indictment, the govern-
ment can forfeit the defendant's right to counsel of choice, for no
lawyer will take the case on a contingency basis; indeed, it would
be unethical to do so.
178
In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States'79 and
United States v Monsanto, 80 the Court sustained the CFA as
172 See, for example, Wheat v United States, 486 US 153, 160-62 (1988).
.73 See United States v Ofshe, 817 F2d 1508, 1511-12 (11th Cir 1987). See generally H.
Richard Uviller, Presumed Guilty: The Court of Appeals Versus Scott Turow, 136 U Pa L
Rev 1879 (1988).
17 See, for example, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, 781 F2d 238
(2d Cir 1986) (en banc).
17' 21 USC § 853.
"' 21 USC § 853(a), (c).
177 21 USC § 853(e).
178 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not
enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect ... a contingent fee for representing a
defendant in a criminal case.").
179 491 US 617 (1989).
'8' 491 US 600 (1989).
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applied to the forfeiture of assets that would be used to retain
counsel. 8' The Court recognized that in some cases forfeiture
would deprive a defendant of his counsel of choice, but it conclud-
ed that the "strong governmental interest in obtaining full recov-
ery of all forfeitable assets ... overrides any Sixth Amendment
interest in permitting criminals to use ... forfeitable [as-
sets] .... 2
This reasoning subordinates important Sixth Amendment
interests. First, it ignores the contingency inherent in a criminal
forfeiture proceeding. Whether or not the assets are "tainted"
depends on the outcome of the proceeding for which the defen-
dant seeks to retain counsel. Second, the argument ignores the
impact of the forfeiture option upon our adversary system. By
merely alleging in an indictment that assets are tainted, the
prosecution could preclude any criminal defendant from retaining
counsel of choice. Third, it ignores the reality that lawyers are
not fungible. Some criminal charges are so complex that special-
ized and well-paid advocates are essential to a fair defense.
Finally, there is the institutional concern. By using its forfei-
ture power, the government is able to exert substantial power
over defendants' ability to choose defense counsel, which allows
the government to prevent the most capable lawyers from repre-
senting certain defendants. By driving the more capable lawyers
from the market, the government is able to weaken the collective
strength of the defense bar in the process, which inevitably dis-
torts the adversary system by skewing the balance of power in
favor of the government in these-and many other--criminal
prosecutions."'
... Id at 606-07; Caplin & Drysdale, 491 US at 622-23.
Id at 631.
" Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role
Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis L Rev 1, 35.
There should be concern as well with the tactics employed by drug enforcement
agents in undercover operations and the use of informers. A recent case provides a good
example of how hard it is to shock the conscience of the federal courts. United States v
Edenfield, 995 F2d 197 (11th Cir 1993), involved an informer who approached a local
sheriff and offered to provide information on one of the sheriff's political enemies. The
sheriff agreed to pay the informer, but only for "results." The informer then purchased
small amounts of drugs from the sheriffs political enemy (the defendant in Edenfield) for
which the sheriff paid the informer $3,600. Id at 197-98.
The sheriff then explained that his goal was to "bust" the defendant with over an
ounce of cocaine. Id at 199. The sheriff said that if the informer could get one of the defen-
dants in a car with more than an ounce of cocaine, the sheriff would pay him $4,000 in
advance and $6,000 afterwards. Id. The informer agreed, and the sheriff paid the advance,
part of which he personally borrowed from a bank. Edenfield, 995 US at 199. The infor-
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III. EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS: SHALL NOT APPLY
TO CRUEL OR RACIALLY DISPARATE POLICE PRACTICES OR
SENTENCING
From the start, the War on Drugs has emphasized law en-
forcement and the criminal process to control and regulate drug
abuse." 4 As a result of these policies, rates of arrest, prosecu-
tions, forfeitures of property, and incarceration have all spi-
raled.185 The legislative response to the drug crisis has been not
only reflexively to expand powers of investigation, but also to
ease the way for imprisonment, both before and after trial, often
in ways that present serious constitutional questions under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The statistics demonstrate the scope and impact of these
punishment initiatives. Fueled by the War on Drugs, arrests,
prosecutions, and imprisonments have increased by dramatic pro-
portions. In 1992, there were over 1.1 million persons confined in
the United States, a population that has increased three-fold in
the past fifteen years.8 " The United States' rate of incarcera-
tion is now over 455 per 100,000;187 by comparison, the rate in
South Africa is 311 per 100,000.88 In 1990, over 4.3 million in-
dividuals were under some form of correctional supervision."9
We incarcerate more people for longer periods of time than any
other industrialized nation, and our rates are ten times higher
than those of Japan or any country in Western Europe. 9 '
mant then made arrangements to ensure that the defendant purchased half of an ounce of
cocaine for himself and agreed to transport five-eighths of an ounce for the informant; this
left the defendant with more than an ounce of cocaine in his car when arrested. Id. The
Court of Appeals reversed a ruling dismissing the indictment, finding nothing wrong with
the targeting of a political opponent, use of a "contingently motivated informer" (one who
would not be paid a full fee absent useful evidence), or sentencing entrapment by manipu-
lating the amount of drugs involved. Id at 199-201. Similar undercover enterprises have
also passed due process challenges. See United States v Barrera.Moreno, 951 F2d 1089
(9th Cir 1991); United States v Ford, 918 F2d 1343 (8th Cir 1990).
'" See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime and the Justice System 74-126 (cited
in note 2); Fox Butterfield, Are American Jails Becoming Shelters from the Storm?, NY
Times 4-4 (July 19, 1992).
"8 See, for example, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section, The State of
Criminal Justice 4, 5, 13 (1993) ("ABA Report"); Marc Mauer, Americans Behind Bars:
One Year Later 7-9 (The Sentencing Project, 1992); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs,
Crime and the Justice System 157-58 (cited in note 2). See generally A Symposium on Sen-
tencing Reform in the States, 64 U Colo L Rev 645 (1993).
1 Mauer, Americans Behind Bars at 2 (cited in note 185).
187 Id at 1.
". Id.
"9 ABA Report at 5 (cited in note 185).
" Mauer, Americans Behind Bars at 5 (cited in note 185).
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A large part of this increase is attributable to persons con-
victed of drug charges only. Nationally, over one-third of all new
inmates are drug offenders.' Over 60 percent of those in feder-
al prisons have been convicted of drug offenses.'92 Between
1986 and 1991, adult arrests for drug offenses rose 25 percent,
and persons imprisoned for these offenses rose 327 percent.193
Increases in arrests are not the only reason for this explosion
in the incarceration rates for drug offenses; the widespread use of
mandatory minimum and guideline sentences is equally signifi-
cant. Federal law, for example, requires a minimum five-year
sentence for possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine,
five hundred grams of cocaine powder, one hundred grams of her-
oin, one hundred kilograms of marijuana, or one gram of
LSD.94 (A gram is about half the weight of a dime.) The weight
is determined by including the carrier for the drug (for example,
a sugar cube for LSD) and the weight of any diluting sub-
stance.'95 The Supreme Court upheld this provision even
though the differences in weight for the same amount of LSD can
be over 2,000 percent, based solely on the manner of market-
ing.19
Mandatory sentencing raises a host of serious problems. This
process results in arbitrary and senseless sentences, so much so
that federal judges have either retired from the bench or, as Se-
nior Judges, have refused to hear these cases.9 7 Senior Judges
Jack B. Weinstein and Whitman Knapp, in public protest over
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and federal sentencing
guidelines, announced that they would no longer preside over
drug cases."' According to Judge William Schwarzer, director
191 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System at 194-95 (cited
in note 2).
192 United States v Clary 846 F Supp 768, 786 (E D Mo 1994); Nkechi Taifa, Mandato-
ry Minimum Sentences Open Up a Pandora's Box, 8 Natl Prison Project J 3 (July 1993).
" ABA Report at 4 (cited in note 185). See also U.S. Department of Justice: Analysis
of Non-Violent Drug Offenders With Minimal Criminal Histories, 54 Crim L Rptr 2101
(Feb 16, 1994).
9 See 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B) (1988).
19 Chapman v United States, 500 US 453 (1991).
19 Id at 467-76 (Stevens dissenting).
' Taifa, 8 Natl Prison Project J at 5-6 (cited in note 192).
19 See Joseph B. Treaster, 2 Judges Decline Drug Cases Protesting Sentencing Rules,
NY Times 1-1 (Apr 17, 1993); Cris Carmody, Revolt to Sentencing Is Gaining Momentum,
Natl Law J 10 (May 17, 1993). Judge Weinstein stated: "I simply cannot sentence another
impoverished person whose destruction has no discernible effect on the drug trade." Judge
Knapp said: "Each day more money is spent and more people go to prison, but there are
more drugs on the street. It makes no sense." Aaron Epstein, Anger Over Bigger Crimes
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of the Federal Judicial Center, such incidents are just the tip of
the iceberg: "This has been coming for a long time. There's been a
very strong undercurrent ... reflecting the realization that these
laws are not working."199
The most troubling aspect of these recent trends is the mani-
fest racial disparities in the rates of arrests and incarceration. In
1990, 25 percent of all African-American men between the ages of
twenty and twenty-nine were incarcerated or on parole or proba-
tion supervision.0 ° This incarceration rate is five times that of
black South Africans. °1 African-Americans are 12 percent of
the population but constitute 44 percent of the American prison
population.0 2
The most dramatic-indeed, scandalous-disparities are
found in drug arrests and incarceration rates. According to na-
tional drug abuse studies, minorities possess and use drugs just
slightly more than whites. For blacks, the rate is 16 percent; for
whites, 12 percent.2 3 The Chief of the Drug Enforcement Agen-
cy has stated that it is "probably safe to say
whites ... [constitute] the majority of traffickers."2 4 Former
"Drug Czar" William J. Bennett stated that "[t]he typical cocaine
user is white, male, a high school graduate employed full time
and living in a small metropolitan area or suburb."2 5 In a fair
system of enforcement, it would therefore be expected that far
fewer blacks (who make up 12 percent of the population) would
be arrested as compared to whites. Just the opposite is true.
Blacks are four times more likely to be arrested on drug charges
than whites.2 6 A USA Today study showed that blacks are
twenty-two times more likely to be arrested in Minneapolis, thir-
teen times as likely in Seattle, and eighteen times as likely in
Columbus, Ohio.20 7
Sparks Debate Over Drug Sentencing, Miami Herald 4A (May 5, 1993). See also Jack B.
Weinstein, The War on Drugs Is Self-Defeating, NY Times A19 (July 8, 1993) (asserting
that penalties in minor drug cases are "unnecessarily harsh"); Whitman Knapp, Dethrone
the Drug Czar, NY Times 4-15 (May 9, 1993).
" Carmody, Natl Law J at 10 (cited in note 198).
20 See Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisit-
ed, 64 U Colo L Rev 743 (1993).
o Mauer, Americans Behind Bars at 1 (cited in note 185).
Butterfield, NY Times at 4-4 (cited in note 184).
Sam Vincent Meddis, Is the Drug War Racist?, USA Today Al (July 23, 1993).
'04 Id.
20 Ron Harris, Blacks Feel Brunt of Drug War, LA Times Al (Apr 22, 1990).
Meddis, USA Today at Al (cited in note 203).
2 Id.
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These results can be explained only by understanding that
police and sentencing practices often reflect racial factors., Police
target minority communities for drug arrests, use racial factors
in their profiles, and, by using the indiscriminate arrest and
search methods described above, place their primary focus on
people of color."0 8 Tactics that would not be tolerated in the sub-
urbs are everyday fare in the inner city, and powerless minorities
have little means of remedying illegal arrests and searches.0 '
Some sentencing statutes also appear to be racially biased.
Perhaps the most notorious example is the differential treatment
of possession of crack as opposed to powdered cocaine. In 1988,
Congress amended the drug laws to provide that a first-time pos-
session conviction for five grams of crack cocaine would result in
a five-year mandatory sentence.210 For cocaine in powdered
form, however, one would have to possess one hundred times this
amount (five hundred grams) to be subject to this punish-
ment. '1 The available evidence indicates that crack cocaine is
used principally by African-Americans, while powder cocaine is
used primarily by Caucasians.212 Of all the defendants sen-
tenced for federal crack cocaine offenses in 1992, 92.6 percent
were black.2"3 The statistics from this disparate sentencing
scheme raise grave concerns about its negative impact on Afri-
can-Americans, who are subject to long mandatory minimum
sentences for simple possession of small amounts of crack, while
first-time offenders convicted of possessing a much larger amount
of cocaine powder are subject to lighter sentences.
To date, the Court has not directly confronted the racial dis-
parities in drug case arrests and sentencing, but its approach to
the race issue in capital sentencing gives a clear indication of its
hands-off posture. In McCleskey v Kemp," the Court consid-
ered a racial discrimination challenge to capital sentencing in
Georgia. To support his claims, the defendant submitted a statis-
tical study of over 2,000 murder cases with data about the
victims' race, the defendants' race, and the combined effect of the
Id.
209 Id.
210 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).
211 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii).
212 State v Russell, 477 NW2d 886, 887 (Minn 1991); United States v Clary, 846 F
Supp 768, 786 (E D Mo 1994), overruled, 34 F3d 709 (8th Cir 1994); United States v
Walls, 841 F Supp 24 (D DC 1994).
21' Clary, 846 F Supp at 786.
214 481 US 279 (1987).
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race of the parties. The study concluded that defendants who kill
white victims are eleven times as likely to receive the death
penalty as those who murder blacks, and that blacks who kill
whites are twenty times more likely to be punished by death
than those who kill blacks.215 The Court rejected the claim, rul-
ing that these statistics did not prove a system of intentional
discrimination and that McCleskey did not prove that racial bias
affected the jury's decision in his case. 21' Anticipating potential
equal protection claims based on differentials in arrests and
sentencing in drug cases, the Court stated that these broad-based
claims would call "into serious question the principles that un-
derlie our entire criminal justice system." 7
The Court's rejection of the compelling statistical evidence of
deep seated racial discrimination represents an unwillingness to
confront a problem that continues to plague all aspects of our
criminal justice system.28 The Court's candidly stated fear that
crediting this evidence would invite other challenges to sentenc-
ing practices is, as Justice Brennan responded, "a fear of too
much justice."18 Moreover, it reveals a fear of reality: a per-
spective that places the continued operation of the criminal jus-
tice system paramount even as against the constitutional man-
date of non-discrimination. To label the statistics constitutionally
irrelevant is simply to wish the problem away.
In light of McCleskey, there is a substantial question wheth-
er the federal courts will carefully scrutinize the racial implica-
tions of drug sentencing laws. To date, several courts have reject-
ed equal protection challenges to crack cocaine sentencing stat-
utes.220 By contrast, several district courts and the Minnesota
Supreme Court have ruled that crack cocaine sentencing schemes
deny equal protection of the laws.22" '
21' Id at 286. The study was conducted by Professor David C. Baldus, a prominent
sociologist and statistician.
21 Id at 312-13, 319.
217 Id at 315.
219 See text at 250-51.
219 McCleskey, 481 US at 339 (Brennan dissenting).
229 United States v Marshall, 998 F2d 634 (8th Cir 1993); United States v Jones, 979
F2d 317 (3d Cir 1992) (race issue not presented); United States v Cyrus, 890 F2d 1245
(DC Cir 1989); Marcia G. Shein, Racial Disparity in "Crack" Cocaine Sentencing, 8 Crimi-
nal Justice 28 (Summer 1993).
" State v Russell, 477 NW2d 886 (Minn 1991); United States v Clary, 846 F Supp 768
(E D Mo 1994), overruled, 34 F3d 709 (8th Cir 1994). See also United States v Majied, US
Dist Lexis 15156 (D Neb 1993) (downward departure from sentencing guidelines because
of unequal impact).
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Laws pertaining to pre-trial confinement and sentencing are
responsible for a significant part of the increase in incarcerations.
In 1984, Congress enacted a Bail Reform Act (the "Act")222 that,
for the first time in our history, provided for preventive deten-
tion.223 Under this Act, a defendant may be detained without
bail if "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably
assure appearance [at trial] ... and the safety of any other per-
son and the community .... 4 The Act requires consideration
of a number of factors to determine whether one should be re-
leased or detained, but it creates a rebuttable presumption that a
defendant charged with an offense under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act should be detained under the above-stated criteria
where the maximum sentence is ten years or more.225 The Act
worked a fundamental change in the bail system and for the first
time authorized the pre-trial imprisonment of a person innocent
of any crime on the theory that she would likely commit other
crimes while awaiting trial.
In United States v Salerno,228 the Court rejected a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the Act, ruling that pre-trial
confinement to ensure appearance at trial or to protect the public
is not "punishment" but rather is regulatory in nature.227 Thus,
in balancing the individual's interest in liberty and the
government's interest in preventing danger to the community,
the Court determined that there is no absolute ban to detaining
individuals for compelling societal needs.228 The Court also
ruled that the Eighth Amendment's proscription of "excessive
bail" does not guarantee the absolute right to bail (only that bail,
if granted, not be excessive). 9
Putting aside the fundamental issues presented by any re-
gime of preventive detention,23 it is notable here that one can
be held without bail under this Act not on any direct proof that
one presents a danger to the community, but rather on the pre-
sumption that because one has been charged with a drug offense
carrying a ten-year sentence, one must constitute such a dan-
22 18 USC § 3141 et seq.
22 See Marc Miller and Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75
Minn L Rev 335 (1990).
224 18 USC § 3142(e).
222 Id.
22 481 US 739 (1987).
227 Id at 746-47.
228 Id at 750-51.
229 Id at 752-55.
2"0 See Miller and Guggenheim, 75 Minn L Rev at 335 (cited in note 223).
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ger.13 Accordingly, the Act authorizes pre-trial imprisonment
based simply on a finding of probable cause for certain drug of-
fenses. Thousands of drug defendants have been incarcerated
under these provisions.232
Sentences for drug offenses can be draconian. Severe manda-
tory minimum sentences are mandated by federal and state
laws,2 3 and the harshness of some courts has led even conser-
vative commentators to compare certain individual cases with the
"evil" practices of Germany's justice system under Hitler."
Substantively, the only possible constitutional break on excessive
sentences is the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. In Solem v Helm,235 the Court ruled that
a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which
the defendant has been convicted,2 6 and it overturned a life
sentence without parole for a repeat offender convicted of writing
a worthless $100 check.237 The Court compared the harshness
of the sentence with the gravity of the offense, the punishment
imposed by that state for other crimes, and punishments imposed
by other states for the same crime.238 Yet, when this issue was
presented in the context of a life sentence for possession of 650
grams of cocaine, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge that
the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment.2 39 "Severe mandatory
penalties may be cruel," Justice Scalia stated, "but they are not
unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in
various forms throughout our Nation's history."24 ° A majority of
the justices did reject the argument that no proportionality re-
view was required by the Eighth Amendment, but these justices,
echoing the litany of evils associated with drugs, had little diffi-
culty in finding this sentence to be constitutional.241
231 See 18 USC § 3142(e).
2 Miller and Guggenheim, 75 Minn L Rev at 335 (cited in note 223).
23 See, for example, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-690, 102 Stat 4181
(1988).
" See Richard A. Posner, Courting Evil, New Republic 36 (June 17, 1991) (book re-
view). See also Douglas 0. Linder, Journeying Through the Valley of Evil, 71 NC L Rev
1111 (1993).
463 US 277 (1983).
Id at 285-90.
237 Id at 281-83, 303.
2m Id at 285-300.
Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957 (1991).
240 Id at 2701 (rejecting the argument that a mandatory life sentence cannot be im-
posed without consideration of mitigating factors).
2"1 Id at 2706-08 (Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter concurring).
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CONCLUSION
The abuse of drugs presents profound problems in our soci-
ety. We have for many years relied principally upon interdiction,
prosecution, and criminal sanctions to reduce the flow of drugs,
but in so doing we have embraced law enforcement policies that
undermine a wide range of constitutional rights. In our zeal to
win this war, we have compromised rights to privacy, autonomy,
liberty, and racial equality. Executive and law enforcement offi-
cials have shown little regard for constitutional rights where
these rights are perceived to interfere with the logistical de-
mands of the War on Drugs. Unfortunately, the judiciary has all
too often deferred to Executive authority, thereby subordinating
constitutional protections to the prerogatives of law enforcement.
If this pattern continues, we risk the loss not only of the War on
Drugs but also significant parts of our constitutional heritage as
well.
